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TWO YEARS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY.

BY SENATOR GEORGE GRAY, OF DELAWARE.

SENATOR DAVIS, in his article entitled "Two Years of Democratic Diplomacy," declares that the "conduct of our foreign relations during the last two years has not reflected honor upon this country." Reading the title and the declaration together, there seems to be an implication that there is a certain brand of diplomacy known as Democratic Diplomacy, which is bad, and another brand known as Republican Diplomacy, which is good. I am unable to admit the existence of such a distinction. But, as an American citizen, equally interested with the distinguished Senator in the honor of the country, I comply with the request of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW to examine his thesis and the arguments by which he has endeavored to support it.

It is argued that the Administration was derelict in admitting the complaint of the German Government against the discriminating duty of one-tenth of a cent a pound imposed on sugars from countries (among which is Germany) that pay a bounty on their exportations; and it is said that such an admission can be sustained only by "special pleading." Whether this charge is well founded is a question not difficult to determine. Our treaty with Prussia, concluded in 1828, not only provides (Article IX.) that neither nation shall grant to any third nation any "favor" in navigation or commerce which shall not immediately become common to the other, but it also provides (Article V.) that neither nation shall impose on the importation of any article the produce or manufacture of the other, any "higher or other duties" than shall be payable "on the like article being the produce or manufacture of any other foreign country." These two clauses, which occur in different articles, though often referred to as securing

“most-favored-nation” treatment, are yet distinct; and it is in consequence of failing to observe this distinction between them, that Senator Davis is led to argue that the treaty does not prevent the imposition of discriminating duties, but only the concession of “special and isolated favors.” When writers, in construing the most-favored-nation clause, have spoken of it as comprehending only favors or privileges, they have referred to the first clause above quoted, and not the second. Not even “special pleading” can make a prohibition of “special and isolated favors” and a prohibition of discriminating duties mean one and the same thing.

For this reason the recent opinion of the Attorney-General as to the duty on German salt, to which Senator Davis refers as decisive of the question of the sugar bounty, has no bearing on that question. The law imposes a duty on salt from countries which levy a duty on American salt, and grants free admission to salt from countries which admit American salt free of duty. This statute offers a favor on a certain condition. The treaty with Prussia contemplates just such a case, when it provided (Article IX.) that any “favor” granted by either party to another nation shall immediately become common to the other party, “freely, where it is freely granted . . . , or on yielding the same compensation, when the grant is conditional.” Germany can secure the “favor” of the free admission of her salt into the United States, by paying “the same compensation” as other nations are required to pay for the privilege, namely, the free admission of American salt. The Attorney-General so held, and it was the only question before him.

What possible bearing can this decision have on the case of a law that imposes upon a certain article, besides the regular duty, an additional and discriminating duty, when such article comes from a country that pays a bounty on its exportation? Bounties, like protective duties, are intended to stimulate domestic industry. They may alike operate to the disturbance of production and manufacture in other countries; but they are considered as measures within the competence of independent governments, and, so long as they are uniform, are not treated as constituting national discriminations. A government no more places itself in a hostile attitude toward foreign countries by adopting one of these measures than it does by adopting the other. As between

the two the bounty is the more generous, since it cheapens goods to the people of foreign countries, and enables them to live more or less at the expense of the bounty-paying country.

Senator Davis says that, if the view taken by the administration be correct, "the power of Congress to legislate in matters of revenue and internal concern can be suspended, impaired, or destroyed by the exercise of the treaty-making power." This is to a certain extent true, but it is not a novel idea. All our commercial treaties have more or less diminished the freedom of action, legislative as well as executive, of the contracting parties. It was with that design that they were made—a fact of which the provision against the laying of discriminating duties is itself conclusive evidence. Discrimination is a game at which two can play. If we would have others abstain, we must engage to abstain also.

In reality, the effort made to save the discriminating duty imposed on sugars from bounty-paying countries is only another of the desperate attempts, of which we have seen so many on the part of protected interests, to maintain their grasp on the pockets of the American people without regard to the nature of the obstacle, whether it be the will of the people or a treaty obligation. Senator Davis, therefore, with great appropriateness, closes the commercial branch of his argument by lamenting the repeal of the misnamed "reciprocity" clause of the McKinley act—a clause under which retaliation was to be dealt out to countries whose tariffs, when compared with our own, should be found, as the clause most truthfully said, to be "reciprocally unequal and unjust." The best Senator Davis can say for it is that its results, during the "short period" of its existence, "were most encouraging." The present competent chief of the Bureau of Statistics of the Treasury Department says, that its "most apparent effect" seems to have been "the restriction of the natural tendency to trade." Under it so-called treaties of varying quality and diverse operation were made as to Brazil, Cuba and Porto Rico, four small Central American States (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Salvador), the Dominican Republic, and certain minor British possessions. In 1892 retaliatory proclamations were issued against Colombia, Venezuela, and Hayti, with all of which countries our trade immediately fell off to a large amount. From Venezuela alone our imports, which were chiefly of coffee

and hides, in two years declined in value to the extent of more than \$8,000,000, while our exports to that country, which had for years been steadily growing, fell from \$4,716,047, in 1891, to \$3,991,908, in 1892. With Colombia, besides our loss of trade, we became involved in a treaty controversy in which I regret to say that our Government did not appear to advantage. While our exports to Brazil from the year 1889, two years before "reciprocity," to 1893, two years after "reciprocity," increased in value up to \$3,000,000, yet from 1891 to 1893 they declined about \$1,700,000. From Cuba our imports of sugar and molasses showed an increase in keeping with the decrease in our importations of those articles from other quarters, and our exports also increased. Indeed, so far as the arrangements were framed on the sound democratic doctrine of liberalizing the conditions of trade, trade increased. But, the result of their operation showed not only that they were to a great extent worthless for that purpose, but also that the retaliatory attachment with which they were operated worked most injuriously.

It is said that "the proceedings of the present administration respecting Hawaii form a composite of blunders, cruelty and usurpation." As in the case of the discriminating sugar duty, the facts are stronger than epithets and refute this charge.

More than fifty years ago the government of the United States, acting upon what was then understood to be an American doctrine, recognized the native government of Hawaii "*as a government suited to the condition of the people, and resting on their own choice.*" Not only were we the first to take that step, but we insisted that other Powers should respect the independence which we had acknowledged. Such was our traditional and honorable policy. This policy in January and February, 1893, was suddenly reversed. In the closing weeks of President Harrison's administration, the country was startled by the news that the established government of the Hawaiian Islands had been overthrown by a revolution in the city of Honolulu. The steamer that brought this news brought also to the country commissioners from a so-called Provisional Government, tendering a treaty of annexation to the United States. While people were inquiring with wonder how this revolution could have been accomplished without premonition, and without the firing of a shot, President Harrison sent to the Senate for ratification a treaty concluded by

him with these Commissioners, providing for the incorporation of the islands into, and as a part of, the United States.

By the documents which accompanied the President's message it for the first time appeared, after they had been printed and considered, that United States Minister Stevens and the forces landed from the ship-of-war *Boston* had been to some extent, but to how large an extent could not then be known, active in deposing the Queen. It appeared that the deposition occurred January 17, 1893; that the Commissioners to the United States were appointed January 18, and sailed for San Francisco January 19, and that they communicated their arrival in Washington by a letter to Secretary Foster, dated February 3. The treaty of annexation was concluded February 14, and sent to the Senate February 15. This indecent haste did not meet with the response that was demanded of the Senate. The country knew nothing, and could know nothing, of the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, given pause by the significant and suspicious intimations gathered from the official documents referred to, declined to act on the treaty before the close of the session on the ensuing 4th of March, though urged by the then Secretary of State to immediate action. This caution on the part of the committee was amply vindicated by subsequent information.

President Cleveland, immediately after his inauguration, was confronted with this situation. There was more than enough in the facts, as disclosed by the papers, to put him upon inquiry as to how far the honor and good name of the United States might be involved in this unusual and precipitate proceeding. He accordingly withdrew the treaty, without prejudice, for further investigation. To properly inform himself of the situation, before and after the overthrow of the established government in those distant islands, it was absolutely necessary that he should send there a trusted agent, to see with his eyes and hear with his ears what the President could not see and hear with his own. His choice fell upon the Hon. James H. Blount, of Georgia. No better selection could have been made. Mr. Blount had just retired from public life, after twenty years of honorable and useful public service in the House of Representatives, with a testimonial from his colleagues as to his character and worth, such as has been rarely accorded to a public man. Within the limits of

this article, we can only refer the reader to the instructions given to Special Commissioner Blount by the Secretary of State, and the report made by him to the Secretary, after patient and intelligent investigation, extending through four months.

From the testimony thus collected, largely from those concerned in the *emeute*, it abundantly appears that the overthrow of the established government was accomplished by an understanding between the conspirators and United States Minister Stevens, by which resistance on the part of the government was prevented by a demonstration of the naval and military forces of the United States. By this means the Queen was induced to surrender. This she did in a formal paper signed by her, and received and filed by the President of the Provisional Government, without comment or dissent. In this she says, among other things :

"I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose Minister Plenipotentiary, His Excellency, John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu, and declared that he would support the said provisional government."

The "Committee of Safety," consisting of the thirteen managers of the "revolution" (seven of whom were Americans), and who, on January 17, proclaimed the Provisional Government, on the 16th, the day before, sent a letter, signed by themselves, to United States Minister Stevens, in which they say :

"We appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance. . . . We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces."

This appeal was promptly responded to, and the forces were landed from the United States ship, *Boston*, that afternoon. The next day, January 17, after the proclamation of the Provisional Government, a communication was sent to Minister Stevens, signed Sanford B. Dole, "Chairman Executive Committee," which, after stating that demand had been made upon the ministers of the Queen to surrender, concludes in this remarkable fashion :

"We request the immediate support of the United States forces, and would request that the Commander-in-Chief of the United States forces take command of our military forces, so that they may act together for the protection of the city."

Some days after this transaction another appeal was made by

President Dole and other officers of the Provisional Government to Minister Stevens, in which they

“Pray that you (he) will raise the flag of the United States for the protection of the Hawaiian Islands for the time being.”

To this appeal Minister Stevens responded by raising the United States flag over the government building, and occupying the same with United States sailors and marines. This was continued for three months, and until the flag was removed and the troops withdrawn by Special Commissioner Blount. It is hard to conceive how the testimony and documentary evidence in the case could be examined by a patriotic American, without having the conclusion forced upon him, that the honor and good name of his country had been seriously compromised by the occurrences of January, 1893, in the Hawaiian Islands.

The trouble has been that this evidence has been too voluminous to be read by the general public, and the opportunity has thus been made to prepossess the public mind with biased and partisan views in the interest of the annexation conspirators.

Let any honest and fair-minded American examine this evidence, or at least read President Cleveland's message of December 18, 1893, and ask himself wherein the President was wrong in regard to this shameful business, when he says:

“I mistake the American people, if they favor the odious doctrine that there is no such thing as international morality, that there is one law for a strong nation, and another for a weak one, and that even by indirection a strong power may, with impunity, despoil a weak one of its territory.”

It is charitable to believe that if President Harrison had possessed all the information disclosed by the investigation set on foot by President Cleveland, the treaty of annexation would never have been concluded by him in such hot haste.

We are told that President Cleveland could no more reconsider his predecessor's recognition of the Provisional Government of Hawaii than he could reconsider the recognition of the Republic in France or in Brazil. But the cases are not parallel. The prior governments in France and Brazil were overthrown by citizens of those countries, not by the naval forces of the United States; our recognition of the new governments was not obtained by false assurances; and they claimed to possess and to exercise the ordinary attributes of governments. The Provisional Government of Hawaii, on the other hand, presented the extraordinary spectacle

of a temporary, revolutionary, self-constituted committee, gotten up for the sole and avowed purpose of handing over the country to another power, and of thus depriving it of its independence. Moreover, the Queen's submission was secured with the understanding that the matter should be heard and determined by the Government of the United States. Mr. Damon, the Vice-President of the Provisional Government, who was sent to obtain her abdication, says so. The Queen herself so declares in her protest, which "S. B. Dole, Esq., and others composing the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands," to whom it was addressed, received without criticism or dissent.

Every impulse springing from sensitive regard for his country's honor and fair fame, must have constrained President Cleveland to seek how he might undo the wrong that had been done this feeble people under the sanction of the power and name of the United States. That he did so seek, will remain an enduring credit to his administration. If there were wanting an example of civil courage and conscientious discharge of high public duty, the conduct of President Cleveland in the Hawaiian episode, in the face of popular clamor, excited by truculent misrepresentations and partisan denunciation, would furnish it. The responsibility for the stain on this page of American history must now rest with Congress.

Senator Davis charges the Administration with exhibiting a "malign disposition" in ordering the U. S. S. *Philadelphia* away from Honolulu "against the warnings of a most competent officer, which subsequent events justified with the accuracy of the fulfillment of prophecy." The officer referred to is Admiral Walker. The "subsequent events," as detailed by Senator Davis, are that "an English vessel, which had been a smuggler of Chinese into the United States and of opium into Hawaii, was chartered for the kindred work of smuggling arms from a British port into Hawaii to aid a royalist insurrection," and that a "revolt took place" in which "American citizens and property were endangered." Senator Davis says that the departure of the *Philadelphia* was "the signal and occasion for rebellion." It appears, however, that Admiral Walker was ordered away from Honolulu on July 20, last; the revolt took place on the 6th of the following January. From the time of his arrival at Honolulu, on April 18, Admiral Walker reported nothing but peace

and order. On July 12, he wrote: "The Royalists must accept the republic or attempt a counter-revolution by physical force, and of such an attempt there is no probability whatever." His "warnings," which were written at sea on August 17, while he was on his way to the United States, related solely to the spectre of British intervention. As to the effect of the entire withdrawal of foreign men-of-war upon affairs in the Islands, he declared that it would be "not unfavorable to order and security," and that "leading members of the Government and others" were "strongly of this opinion" and had expressed "satisfaction with the prospect of being left for a time entirely alone." Judged by the event, the Admiral's gift of prophecy, with which Senator Davis is so deeply impressed, is yet to be demonstrated. A revolt ultimately occurred, but there was no British ship and no British intervention. Even the arms, as it now turns out, were shipped from San Francisco on an American vessel. And after the revolt was over, President Dole expressed to our minister at Honolulu his gratification that no national ship was present during the disturbance, as it gave his Government "an opportunity to prove its ability to take care of itself, which if once done would probably insure permanent peace."

Senator Davis finds further evidence of a "malign disposition" in the recommendation made by President Cleveland, at the request of the Hawaiian Government, that our treaty with that country be so modified as to permit the lease of either Necker Island, French Frigate Shoals, or Bird Island to the British Government as a station for a cable from Canada to Australia. Perhaps we shall all regret, when the Hawaiian frenzy has passed away, that such a simple request was not granted. The islands in question are small uninhabited rocks. Necker Island, which lies midway between the other two, was described by Admiral Walker in April last as "a very small islet, about 270 miles" distant from the Hawaiian "group"; and he said that, while it had always been claimed by Hawaii, "no one had actually landed there and taken possession, owing to the difficulty of landing." Senator Davis sees in this matter an attempt on the part of Great Britain to "install herself on one of the (Hawaiian) Islands," and declares that "it is not correct to say that Hawaii desires it." The Hawaiian Government, however, sought to effect it, expressed a confident belief that the Hawaiian legislature would liberally

subsidize a branch cable to Honolulu, and spoke of the "great and unquestioned importance to the country" of such an opportunity. It seems unnecessary to argue this subject further.

The next proof of the badness of "Democratic Diplomacy" is described as "the delivery to China by this Government of the two Japanese students at Shanghai, and their decapitation at Nankin." We are told that "the blood of these youths is on our hands." Indeed, Senator Davis says "it is difficult to discuss this abominable transaction with moderation." Perhaps a plain and simple presentation of the law and the facts, will show that the distinguished Senator has found it not only difficult but impossible to do so.

In July last, when hostilities between China and Japan became imminent, our diplomatic representatives at Peking and Tokio were instructed respectively, to afford their "friendly offices" for the protection of Japanese subjects in China and of Chinese subjects in Japan. The function with which they were thus clothed, in accordance with the wishes as well as with the consent of both those Governments, presented no new question. Our representatives in Mexico had discharged a similar function in behalf of Frenchmen and Belgians, in peace as well as in war; and our minister in France had assumed the protection of Germans during the Franco-German war. Moreover, our diplomatic and consular representatives had for many years extended protection to citizens of Switzerland in various countries, including China; and on July 25, 1872, the Department of State instructed our Minister at Peking that "the protection referred to must necessarily be confined to the personal and unofficial good offices of such functionaries," that even this could "properly be done only with the consent of the Chinese Government," and that such consent "must not be allowed to imply an obligation on the part of a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in that country to assume criminal or civil jurisdiction over Swiss citizens, or to make himself or his Government accountable for their acts."

The extra-territoriality—or exemption from the local law—which the citizens of certain foreign powers enjoy in China and Japan, rests solely upon the treaties and is measured by their terms. By the treaty between China and Japan, signed at Tientsin September 13, 1871, it was provided that a citizen of the one

country, charged with an offense within the jurisdiction of the other, should, if at a port, "be tried by the local authority and the consul together"; but that he should, if in the interior, "be tried and dealt with by the local authority." Thus Chinese in Japan and Japanese in China, did not possess the complete exemption from the local law, which Americans and certain other foreigners enjoy in those countries.

The war, which was declared by Japan on August 1, having abrogated the treaty of Tientsin, the Japanese Government, by an Imperial ordinance of August 4, declared that Chinese in Japan, should thereafter be wholly subject to the jurisdiction of the Japanese civil and military authorities. It is superfluous to say that, as the provisions of the treaty of Tientsin were strictly reciprocal, the effect of its abrogation on the status of Japanese subjects in China, was necessarily the same as that upon the status of Chinese subjects in Japan. They became wholly subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities.

On August 18 the Chinese Minister complained to Secretary Gresham that Mr. Jernigan, the Consul-General of the United States at Shanghai, was protecting Japanese spies. Inquiry of our *Chargé d'Affaires* at Pekin elicited the fact that on the 13th of the month the Consul-General of France at Shanghai had, at the instance of the Chinese authorities, caused two Japanese subjects to be arrested in the French concession, and, not deeming himself authorized to hold them, had delivered them over to the Consul-General of the United States; that, at the time of their arrest, they were "wearing Chinese clothing," and that "plans were found upon them"; and that, though they were charged with being spies, the United States Consul-General had refused to deliver them up. These circumstances, as well as the suggestion made by the *Chargé d'Affaires*, that the Consul-General should be ordered to examine the case with a "Chinese official present," seemed to indicate that our representatives in China were laboring under the impression, that they were somehow authorized to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Japanese subjects in China, according to the forms of the abrogated treaty of Tientsin, even where such subjects were charged with offenses against the laws of war. The Secretary of State, therefore, instructed the Legation that lending "good offices" did "not invest Japanese with extra-territoriality," and that neither

the legation nor the consulates should be made asylums "for Japanese who violate local laws or commit belligerent acts"; that protection must be "exercised unofficially and consistently with neutrality"; and that the Consul-General should not have received the two Japanese and was "not authorized to hold them." On September 1 the *Chargé d'Affaires* at Peking directed the Consul-General to deliver the alleged spies to the Chinese authorities. With a view, however, to prevent any summary action, Secretary Gresham obtained from the Chinese minister a voluntary assurance—there being no authority to demand any other—that the men would not be tried till Colonel Denby, the Minister of the United States at Peking, who was then absent on leave in the United States, should return to his post. While this assurance was not kept, the trial of the men was postponed, and they were not executed till six weeks after their surrender.

On the 5th of September, the Legation of Japan in Washington declared, that the action of the Consul-General in delivering the men up "was entirely in conformity with the Japanese interpretation of the authority and power of neutral consuls in a belligerent country," and that, if the case were reversed, "Japan would not recognize the jurisdiction of any neutral consul over the suspect." This declaration was reaffirmed by the Legation on the 9th of September, with specific references to the Imperial Ordinance of the 4th of August. When, not long afterward, the new minister from Japan arrived in Washington, he stated that it was the opinion of his Government that neither the Consul-General at Shanghai, nor any other agent of the United States in China, was authorized to refuse the demand of the authorities. In October, Colonel Denby, our Minister to China, while on his return to his post after a leave of absence in the United States, had an interview with Viscount Mutsu, the Imperial Japanese Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who "emphatically repudiated the idea that American consuls could exercise jurisdiction over Chinese in Japan," and left the whole question, as Mr. Denby says, exactly as it has been ordered, both in China and in Japan.

Is it possible to doubt that, if this transaction were not viewed as a matter of "Democratic Diplomacy," the complete concurrence of all the Governments concerned, would be regarded as leaving absolutely no room for discussion, much less for criti-

cism, as to the legality and propriety of what was done? Senator Davis speaks of the "right of asylum" and declares that the "presence (of the two Japanese) at the American Legation was not only rightful," but that "it had been invited by the arrangement for the protection by this Government of Japanese residents, to which China had assented." In these statements, however, the distinguished Senator is in error. The men were not in the American Legation, which is at Peking, but in the Consulate-General at Shanghai, which is not a diplomatic post; nor had there been any "arrangement" by which persons charged with offenses, and least of all with military offenses, were invited to seek asylum either in the legation or in the consulates. It appears that the understanding of all parties to the arrangement was just the reverse. The Consul-General had no right to grant asylum, or to act upon the theory, which Senator Davis suggests, that the case was to be treated as one of extradition. Had the case been so treated, there was evidence on which to justify surrender. But the men were not in the United States. They were in China, and, as the Japanese Government has itself declared, were subject to the action of the Chinese authorities.

Senator Davis also says that the Department of State "should have refused to deliver these men, upon the ground that they were not spies under any definition outside China"; that they "were not spies under any definition, even if their pockets had been found stuffed with military information"; and he quotes two definitions to the effect that a spy is a person who collects information "within the lines of an enemy" or "within the lines of one of the hostile armies." Our own statutes, however, provide (Act of March 3, 1863, *chap.* 75, *sec.* 38) that all persons who in time of war "shall be found lurking or acting as spies in or about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters, or encampments of any of the armies of the United States, or elsewhere," shall be triable by a military commission, and shall, upon conviction, suffer death; and by section 88 of the "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field," a spy is defined as "a person who secretly in disguise, or under false pretense, seeks information with the intention of communicating it to the enemy." It has been seen not only that the two Japanese, who pretended to be simply students, were, when arrested, disguised in Chinese clothing, but that "plans were found

upon them"; and Mr. Jernigan, in one of his despatches, says that some of the papers found in their possession "would naturally, in the state of war now existing, create a suspicion of a character tending to support the alleged charge." The Chinese Government states that, besides these evidences of guilt, the prisoners admitted, without torture, that they had been employed as spies in obtaining and transmitting to their Government by telegraph and otherwise, information useful in conducting military operations against China.

In regard to this case I have only one more observation to make. No sooner had the men been delivered up, than there began to appear in the public prints a succession of reports, whose evidently unauthentic and sensational character gave warning that the incident would not be permitted to perish for lack of dramatic treatment. It was at first announced that the prisoners were beheaded, apparently without trial, immediately after their surrender. When this was shown to be untrue, rumors of cruelty began to take place of reports of decapitation; and, toward the close of November, Mr. Julian Ralph, a popular writer for the press, published in *Harper's Weekly* a story of torture, which surpassed in horror all prior reports, and which was so minute in its details that it even specified the various methods and the duration of the torture and gave the last words of the victims. A few days afterward, however, when interrogated as to his authority for these statements, Mr. Ralph, as reported in the press, could only say: "The truth as to whether the men were horribly tortured or not rests with God and the Chinese. Everybody believed the stories when I was in China." It appears, therefore, that the story so dramatically told had precisely the same basis—that of common rumor—as previous reports in respect of which Mr. Jernigan, in one of his despatches, declared that many of them were "so false as to be past finding out." And it should also be noticed that Mr. Ralph, when asked whether it was "certain" that the men "were not spies," frankly admitted that "there was great reason to believe that they were." He said that Japan had been covering China with spies, and that when the men were arrested an inculpatory paper, containing military information, was found in the lining of the coat of one of them. In a despatch of November 2 Mr. Jernigan reported that "their cases were under investigation for nearly six weeks,"

and that he was assured that "there was no unfairness practiced against them during the investigation." In a despatch of the 26th of the same month, written in Shanghai almost at the moment when Mr. Ralph's article appeared in New York, Mr. Jernigan further says: "A letter from an intelligent foreigner residing at Nankin, where the two Japanese spies were executed, discredits the report of their torture. Other letters from the same gentleman have proved so accurate, that I am disposed to accept the reported torture as without substantial proof."

Having reviewed the grounds on which the conduct of our foreign relations during the last two years has been condemned, I deem it proper to refer to certain important incidents not mentioned by Senator Davis. When the present Administration came into power, our relations with China had fallen into a condition which might with moderation have been described as discreditable. Without seeking to impute blame to any one for that fact, it is permissible to say, that the present Administration has made a treaty by which our relations with that country have been restored to their former basis of honorable reciprocity. An epoch-making treaty has also been concluded with Japan, by which that progressive empire has been admitted to a position of international equality. The difficult situation that arose in Brazil, in consequence of the revolt of persons who were understood to possess the sympathy of certain European powers, was treated with a consistent and unwavering firmness which forced those who would not approve to be silent. The same thing may be said of the management of the Bluefields incident, which involved the long-contested claim of Great Britain to a protectorate over the Mosquito Coast. Nothing could have been easier in the beginning, or less likely to be productive of advantage in the end, than to make this incident the subject of a wordy controversy and of national alarm. But, by the exercise of a wise and tactful diplomacy, a final settlement was attained in accordance with American views. I think it may be said that the conduct of our foreign relations during the last two years has reflected great honor and lasting benefit upon the country.

While I declined, at the outset, to recognize such a distinction as that implied by the terms Democratic diplomacy and Republican diplomacy, I am prepared to admit that I have heard of a spurious diplomacy—sometimes called "thoroughly American"

—which its advocates are welcome to the privilege of calling Republican diplomacy, if they so desire. Its conscious advocates are perhaps few, but there is reason to fear that its dupes are many; and neither its advocates nor its dupes are exclusively confined to one party. But, unless the glories of our past history are to be discarded, it is not American diplomacy. It is meddling and aggressive; it is envious and suspicious; it is covetous and not very scrupulous; it exemplifies the evil of power without self-control, and of susceptibility to insult without a due proportion of self-respect. Its spirit is that of conquest; its first reason, as well as its last, is force. It began its career by embroiling us, under a Republican Secretary of State, in the quarrels of South American republics in 1881, only to be rebuked by another Republican Secretary of State in 1882. It has claimed the right, in disregard of our own most cherished traditions, to visit and search the ships of friendly powers on the high seas in time of peace, only to be condemned by an impartial tribunal of arbitration. It overthrows by force a Queen in Hawaii in the name of liberty and annexation, and maintains by force a King in Samoa in the name of independence and autonomy. If this be Republican diplomacy, and we are to have more of it, God help the American Republic!

GEORGE GRAY.